Anti-Enforcement Injunctions: Delay, Futility, and Comity
In January 2025, the English Commercial Court handed down judgment in Google LLC & Anor v NAO Tsargrad Media & Ors [2025] EWHC 94 (Comm). Amongst other things, the judgment is significant for clarifying the effect of an applicant’s delay on the English courts’ willingness to grant anti-enforcement injunctions (“AEIs”). The Court held that an applicant’s delay does not necessarily bar the grant of an AEI: there may be countervailing factors, such as the futility of earlier relief, the territorial scope of the AEI, and/or the exorbitance of the judgment whose enforcement the AEI seeks to restrain.
Facts
The case concerned a series of Russian judgments from April 2021 to October 2022. The Russian judgments ordered Google to restore three sanctioned Russian media companies’ access to their suspended Google and YouTube accounts, failing which Google would be required to pay escalating financial penalties to those companies (so-called astreinte penalties).
Google refused to comply with the Russian judgments, incurring astreinte penalties totalling an unprecedented £1.85 octillion by May 2024. The Russian companies commenced enforcement proceedings against Google in Russia and other jurisdictions (but not England). In August 2024, Google applied to the Commercial Court for AEIs restraining the Russian companies from enforcing the Russian judgments outside Russia, on the grounds that those judgments were obtained in breach of dispute resolution agreements between the parties.
AEIs and Delay
The key issue facing the Court was delay. The general rule is that delay bars injunctive relief: therefore, a party seeking an injunction relating to a breach of a dispute resolution agreement must act as soon as possible after becoming aware of the breach.
Google delayed seeking an injunction for several years. The Russian proceedings commenced between 2020-2022, so Google knew about proceedings that breached the relevant dispute resolution agreements for 2-4 years before it applied for an AEI in August 2024. So long a period of delay would normally suffice to bar relief: Google could have sought an anti-suit injunction (“ASI”) before the Russian judgments were handed down in 2021/2022, or else sought AEIs immediately afterwards.
Futility and Comity
Despite Google’s delay, the Court granted the AEIs. The Court held that Google’s delay did not bar relief, because (i) it would have been futile to seek ASIs/AEIs earlier, (ii) it would not breach comity towards the Russian courts to grant the AEIs, given that the AEIs only restrain enforcement of the Russian judgments outside Russia, and (iii) this was an exceptional case, given the exorbitance of the astreinte penalties imposed pursuant to the Russian judgments.
Taking these in turn, first, the Court held that Google’s delay was excusable because of the futility of seeking ASIs/AEIs any earlier. Russian law allows sanctioned Russian companies to litigate in Russian courts notwithstanding dispute resolution agreements. Consequently, it would have been futile for Google to seek ASIs/AEIs while proceedings/enforcement were confined to Russia, as the Russian companies would have relied on Russian law to ignore any such ASIs/AEIs.
Second, the Court held that Google’s delay was excusable because there was no breach of comity towards the Russian courts. According to the Court, the rule against delay in seeking ASIs/AEIs exists, inter alia, to avoid a foreign court having wasted time and resources hearing proceedings and/or handing down a judgment. But, in this case, there was no breach of comity: the AEIs sought only restrain enforcement of the Russian judgments outside Russia, so the Russian courts have not wasted time and resources as their judgments are still enforceable within Russia.
Third, the Court held that Google’s delay was excusable because the exorbitance of the astreinte penalties made this case an exception to the general rule against delay. The Court noted that it had discretion as to whether to grant AEIs, and therefore could, in an appropriate case, set aside delay considerations. Given that the astreinte penalties were of enormous magnitude, the attempt to enforce them abroad was considered exorbitant, and justified setting aside Google’s delay.
Conclusion
Google LLC & Anor v NAO Tsargrad Media & Ors therefore makes clear that delay will not always bar the grant of injunctive relief. There may be exceptional circumstances – such as where seeking earlier relief would have been futile, where there are (unusually) no comity considerations, or where the proceedings or judgment in question is exorbitant.
Note: This is a general summary of an evolving field of law and is made available for general discussion purposes only between CANDEY and its clients and prospective clients. This memorandum does not constitute legal advice and must not be relied on as such. It should also not be cited as legal or academic authority.
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